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This special issue is a reflection on the role of law in structuring the real and imagined 
spaces of empire.  Recently, there has been a surge of interest in imperial history, 
motivated by the perceived need to recover the specific political, economic, social and 
psychological routes traversed by different portions of the world in the journey 
towards a globalized modernity.
1
  Within this trend, there has been a particularly 
vibrant interest in tracing the role of law, especially during the age of empires, when it 
assumed a very special role in producing new regimes and social structures, the marks 
and effects of which postcolonial societies continue to bear.
2
  This markedly inter-
disciplinary interest in law and empire has demonstrated a high level of spatial 
awareness.  Scholars from a number of disciplines have begun to think about empires 
as peculiarly structured spaces, bringing the insights and methodologies of historical 
geographers to work on non-traditional themes and material, one of these being legal 
pluralism, or the multiplicity of competing legal orders, all operational within the 
same jurisdiction.
3
  The diversity of approaches and conclusions in this growing and 
somewhat ill-defined area is obvious.  Nonetheless, many seem to have arrived at the 
notion of empire as an inevitably multi-layered, porous and fractured space; a notion 
that does not discard the fact of colonial violence and the ideological aggression of 
imperialists, and indeed, builds upon them to displace a view of empires as 
territorially and ideologically stable and bounded units entailing predictable, if 
oppressive control of colonized populations by colonizers.
4
  In place of land-based 
empires with well-policed borders, clear laws and clean-cut bureaucracies, we now 
have borderlands and lumpy seascapes crisscrossed by corridors carved by trade, 
treaties and piracy.  In place of the ideological surety of colonial “lawfare” and anti-
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colonial resistance,
5
 “jurisdictional jockeying” seems to be the forte of motley 
imperial legal actors.
6
  Such a vision has entailed, among other things, the awareness 
of alternative, non-metropolitan articulations of law, righteous order and justice, and 
the possibility that such articulations were convincing to many and effective in 
shaping the everyday empire.  This collection of essays looks beyond pragmatic, 
situational “jockeying,” and also ad-hoc rationalization or “jurispractice,” towards 
recovering some of those alternative, non-dominant legal visions and the sources of 
their reasoning.  In this way we seek to understand the legal spaces of empire from 
and through those alternative vantage points.   
 
A number of historiographical trends have converged on this impromptu, and 
not always consciously shared, agenda of exploring the role of law in the structuration 
of imperial spaces.  These include the obvious candidates of histoire croisée,
7
 trans-
national histories,
8
 histories of mobile populations and diasporas and of legal efforts 
to regulate their movements and rights,
9
 histories of borderlands,
10
 histories of penal 
settlements,
11
 but also histories of imperial diplomacy and treaty-making,
12
 new 
histories of settler colonies,
13
 explorations of trans-continental constitutions,
14
 and 
studies of political or legal philosophers who pondered upon the fact and justifications 
of empire.  All of these works point to law’s capacity for structuring human 
geographies, the scope that empire afforded to that power, and also to the 
contradictions that imperial rule generated. 
 
Law, as we know, creates a very specific kind of space called jurisdiction—the 
area over which it has authority.  This area is not necessarily territorial; it can be an 
arena of social interactions, such as commerce (mercantile law), war (military law), or 
religion (church law).  Historians of political philosophy and jurisprudence have long 
been concerned with jurisdiction, as well as the source of its legitimacy—sovereignty.  
Since the Westphalian resolution in Europe, there has been a distinct contradiction 
between the claims of complete territorial sovereignty of national laws (defined 
against the claims of any universal empire or church), and the expansive ambitions of 
“secular” universal law (as natural law).  Modern empires did not just complicate this 
territorial grid; they embodied its core contradiction.  In its universalist mode, 
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imperial law aspired to be global but not international since it denied the possibility of 
sovereignty to those not measuring up to supposedly universal standards that could 
only be derived from Europe.  These modern empires simultaneously permitted the 
suspension of those alleged universal standards in connection to places beyond 
Europe, and with respect to the status, rights and governance of those who lived 
there.
15
  Tautologically, the universal standards themselves offered the principal 
needed for such differentiation—if Indigenous peoples of the Americas, Australia, or 
the African continent did not display what early modern European thinkers had 
decided were the ‘natural’ markers of human social behavior, they could be 
dispossessed, enslaved and exterminated.  The rise of a new concept of treaty-based 
“law of nations” in the late eighteenth century added another layer of justification for 
the continued exclusion of most from this brave new world of law.  Meanwhile, a few, 
mostly European settlers, entered the small club of the “powers of the world,” 
considered adequately treaty-worthy by other members and capable of offering 
recognizable rights to their citizens.
16
  Racism as science offered a later, further and 
apparently less ambiguous principle (compared to geography, culture or politics) in 
this longue-durée effort at defining and justifying the “rule of colonial difference.”17 
 
 Thus differentiated from their “Others,” Europeans in the age of empires 
could continue to imagine law as absolute, universal and transcendent, even when it 
facilitated unrestrained violence, exclusion, and denial of humanity.  Law, in such a 
mode, could only be a European gift to humanity, handed out in history through 
colonization.  With the assumption that Europe was the unique crucible of lawfulness 
and civilization, the European heterosexual male could pose as the universal legal 
subject, entitled to stride across the “whole vacant earth” like a Colossus, responding 
to their ardent call “Come and till me, come and reap me!”18  Indeed, eminent legal 
scholars and philosophers such as Peter Fitzpatrick and Giorgio Agamben have 
pointed to this persistent “myth” of Europe’s unique lawfulness on which modern law 
continues to rest, negating all other codes as myths, denying its own indeterminacy 
and duplicity, and relegating myriad others, within and outside Europe, to a perpetual 
“state of exception.”19 
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The ideological claims of imperial/colonial law have been judged by many 
scholars working on various parts of the British Empire (for example) to have been 
tremendously effective.  They enabled and justified the creation of new techniques of 
governance aimed at utter transformation of existing social, political and economic 
structures of colonized societies, as well as the alteration of primary cultural 
categories; indeed, entire physical, political and mental geographies.  But these older 
works also pointed towards the hybrid reality of imperial geographies, anticipating 
Lauren Benton’s recent interventions.  Thus, when the historical anthropologist 
Bernard Cohn emphasized the opposition between two normative systems within 
colonial Indian law, he was attempting to explain the failure of colonial law (and by 
extension modern Indian law) to gain either moral traction or efficient 
enforceability.
20
  His Africanist counterparts, writing much later, have pointed to 
slave-trading principalities on the west coast of Africa, noting how these regimes 
negotiated British abolitionism and the obligations imposed by treaties with Britain, 
without abandoning either their commitment to procuring coerced labour or concepts 
of power based on the ability to do so.
21
  Subsequent works on South Asian history 
have explored the reasons for and effects of (not necessarily peaceful) compromise 
and hybridity in colonial law.  David Washbrook, for instance, suggested that the 
“military-fiscal” nature of the Company’s government in India precluded any 
possibility of substantiation of the universalist, transformative claims of colonial law, 
rendering it perpetually “Janus-faced.”22  A similar story of pragmatic accommodation 
arising out of policy imperatives informed Radhika Singha’s study of criminal justice 
in early colonial India, where Weberian claims of the state’s exclusive right to 
legitimate violence were inevitably compromised through the accommodation of pre-
existing community identities, social and sexual hierarchies and privileges, rendering 
the universal legal subject elusive.
23
 
 
Historians of political thought have of course powerfully argued that 
Europeans were capable of more complex and nuanced imaginations of global order, 
and of recognising the place of both non-Europeans as legal subjects and non-
Europeans sources of law and legitimacy within that order.  Jennifer Pitts has pointed 
out that key British and French political and legal philosophers of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century devised sophisticated rationales for incorporating distant 
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places and unfamiliar people into a legal order that was also ethical and consistent; 
rather than only accommodating perceived difference on the basis of policy 
considerations.
24
  In a more territorially and temporally located but also more 
pessimistic study, Robert Travers has pointed to the layering of empires in the 
political ideas of Alexander Dow, Warren Hastings, Philip Francis and others in 
eighteenth-century Bengal who attempted to explain the nature of the regime created 
by the East India Company’s battles and intrigues as an inheritance from a Mughal 
constitutional order, albeit one that was largely imagined according to the interests of 
the particular East India Company faction that the specific writer represented.
25
 
 
In this collection, we are curious but cautious about such claims of either 
sympathy or continuity, especially where conveniently invented traditions rendered 
colonial societies more governable, and bolstered rather than criticised the hierarchies 
of the colonial order.  We are aware, for example, that based on his extensive study of 
the many collations of, and application of what purported to be the “native” or 
“customary” law of African societies, Martin Chanock has forcefully argued that such 
codification formalised racial difference, and their administration through segregated 
judicial systems built and sustained the racial hierarchies of colonial societies.
26
  
Indeed, if we think of the kinds of social and legal geographies that the application of 
such allegedly indigenous legal systems created, we see not only spatial separation, 
but deprivation of economic, political and legal opportunities for Africans, obliged to 
reside in “reserves” or acquire special passes allowing them to travel for work to 
similarly segregated cities.  On the other hand, colonised people themselves were not 
immune to the attractions of creative authenticity.  In this connection, one can think 
equally of Chagga communities of Mount Kilimanjaro, innovative in their uses of 
property but claiming the legitimacy of customary law,
27
 while also being reminded of 
the spatial metaphor of “home and the world” used by the (inevitably male) Indian 
nationalist efforts in order to claim autonomy from the colonial state’s interventions in 
key areas of social life (involving, among other things, control over women).
28
  This 
highlights the importance of gender in the creation and deployment of legally 
significant traditions, and reminds us of the frequently noted transformation of women 
into symbolically loaded territory for ethical and political competition rather than 
agents in their own right.
29
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Colonised people almost everywhere also learnt very rapidly how to deploy 
key categories of imperial/colonial ideology and governance against the colonisers 
themselves.  This was not limited to European pirates in the Indian Ocean who 
flourished (sometimes lost, perhaps non-existent) pieces of paper to establish their 
status as lawful “privateers.”  By the early nineteenth century, several Indigenous 
nations in North America claimed to possess full-blown constitutions, and hence 
asserted their rightful place among the “powers of the world,” with or without the 
benefit of cultural multi-dexterity possessed by occasional mixed-race leaders.
30
  
Elsewhere, the “rule of law” has been shown to be a potent argument, regularly and 
sometimes successfully deployed by colonized people to question and subvert the 
coercive capacity of the colonial state.
31
 
 
In encapsulating the kind of material presented by this set of essays, a concept 
that we find very useful is that of the “Middle Ground”—a spatial metaphor used by 
Richard White for describing a specific, historically and geographically located 
regime, created by motivated mutual misunderstandings between people in conflict, 
misunderstandings that were nevertheless productive of a new order in which at least 
functional communication could take place.
32
  White was himself studying 
seventeenth-century Canada, and has declared bemusement at his conceptual 
framework for the Great Lakes being put to work for analysing contexts widely 
different from his own.  While taking note of the dangers of taking explanatory 
frameworks too far from their empirical home, what attracts us to the notion of a 
“Middle Ground” is its in-built methodological need for, and hence the opportunity it 
offers, for examining carefully the different socio-cultural-political worlds from 
which operational concepts were derived for the ultimate hybrid product.  For area 
specialists studying empire, this offers us the opportunity to study contact without 
losing context. 
 
It is also important to highlight that we see interaction not only in ideational 
terms, but also in terms of governance, experience, and habitation.  Historians of 
urbanism have offered us substantive material and contexts for exploring the idea of 
such negotiation.  The possibility of a fluid space between the colonial state and the 
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subject population was expanded by both Mattison Mines and Neil Brimnes who 
referred to the ways in which local society used European courts and participated in a 
fluid society of personal relationships that marked eighteenth-century urban society.
33
  
The nature and ramifications of Anglo-Indian commercial relations and business 
partnerships in what Mines saw as a frontier space in colonial towns meant that there 
was a creative dialogue between judicial conventions and practices for a pragmatic 
resolution of disputes, although not necessarily any fundamental reconciliation of the 
normative systems in contact.  Pointing to a less urbane and bleaker landscape, Clare 
Anderson’s work on non-European, mainly Indian, convicts transported to penal 
settlements across the Indian Ocean, and her use of the biographical method based on 
non-traditional, extremely fragmentary sources offers insights into the way in which 
law, through punishment, substantiated colonial categories of differentiation, for 
example with the legal restriction of Indian convicts to within a certain distance from 
the equator, based on geo-biological theories.  However, Anderson’s biographical 
method transcends the narrative of regulation to point to the manner in which the 
subaltern subjects of her study travelled to and inhabited punitive sites, frequently 
managing to re-situate themselves in the social order of those places.
34
  
 
  “Law and the Spaces of Empire” engages with a number of key propositions 
arising out the existing literature, which are addressed by each of the essays in this 
collection, but in different ways, and with distinct, not necessarily reconcilable results.  
We are not equally convinced about the genuineness or effectiveness of the Burkean 
rhetoric of moral sympathy; not equally sure about the relative balance of conviction 
and instrumentality in colonised or marginal populations’ use of metropolitan legal 
norms; and do not subscribe equally to a vision of shaky imperial regimes, porous 
boundaries, and European rulers dependent on the laws and customs of their 
indigenous subjects.  However, we are all inspired by what we see as an emerging 
project of breaking down the idea of imperial sovereignty as an extension of 
metropolitan ideas.  We are keen to reconstitute imperial sovereignty as an 
aggregation of plural legal realities and imaginations, without losing sight of the fact 
that this was a plurality shaped by unequal power, and indeed characterised by zones 
unbridled violence as much as the possibility of subaltern agency.  We are concerned 
with policy imperatives and everyday governance as much as ideological statements 
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and jurisprudence, and we are minded to retain the distinction between these, 
precisely so that we can explore the connections between them.  Above all, however, 
we seek to highlight the alternative: the everyday practices, unsystematic resistance, 
and non-metropolitan voices, rationales and imaginations, and to work out the cultural 
and material worlds that shaped those other visions of the legal geographies of 
empire. 
 
Given our focus, we are methodologically as well as intellectually charged 
with the need to discover not just contestation but its meaning in and through the 
messiness of moments of legal interaction, captured unsystematically in multi-sited 
colonial archives, in multiple genres of expression and in many languages.  Articles in 
this collection therefore deploy a number of methodologies in order to trace that 
elusive quantity: the visions of those that did not win, or so it seemed at the time.  In 
each case, the essays examine the place of law, the significance of location and 
meaning of empire for the protagonists of their stories, as well as the significance of 
those stories for historians studying empire today.  Each investigates what kind of 
local apparatuses—social, intellectual, political or indeed clerical—deflected the 
regimes of dominance and difference, thereby producing parallel spaces that we can 
only attempt to imaginatively reclaim.  Studying a wide geographical terrain 
comprising of territories and seas from the Bay of Bengal to the Cape Colony, 
including the maritime world of the Indian Ocean, and temporally extending between 
the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries, these articles and their findings are 
capable of collectively offering methodological and analytical answers to scholars 
working on related themes in other contexts.  
 
Each essay in this collection addresses a specific context, temporally and 
geographically, within the range delineated above, and deploys a specific set of source 
material and interpretive methodology for asking how law structured the spaces of 
empire.  Mitch Fraas’ essay, “Making Claims: Indian Litigants and the expansion of 
the English legal world in the eighteenth century,” is an exercise in trans-national 
history while also being a close study of the routine procedures of eighteenth-century 
English legal culture.  Drawing on the concept of a “trans-national constitution,” 
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developed by scholars working on eighteenth-century Anglo-American negotiations 
of identity, rules of governance and political entitlements, Fraas extends the same 
story eastwards, producing the kind of multi-hemispheric imperial history that Peter 
Marshall has been recommending for some time now.
35
  Through a study of the legal 
conundrums raised by eighteenth-century Indian litigants who determinedly pursued 
their causes in a number of apex courts in England, and using a range of legal 
sources—briefs, judge’s notebooks, expert legal opinion and the texts of judgments—
Fraas arrives at a critically optimistic view of the capaciousness of identity and rights 
afforded by the emerging “imperial constitution,” while noting the discomfitures and 
dissonances between different assessments of the place of India and Indians within the 
notion of British imperial subjecthood.  
 
Nandini Chatterjee, in her essay “Hindu City and Just Empire: Banaras and 
India in Ali Ibrahim Khan’s legal imagination,” tells a comparable story from the 
opposite end, and shows how a Shi‘a nobleman and a late Mughal bureaucrat 
recruited by the English East India Company was able to deploy familiar procedures 
of Islamic jurisprudence, combined with an equally well-known Mughal 
administrative rationality, in order to respond to the many demands on his position as 
judge-magistrate of Banaras, a north Indian city at the cusp of several competing 
empires.  Using a combination of archival records and Persian manuscript sources, 
Chatterjee reveals that, when faced with the possibility of multiple laws and/or legal 
interpretations, Ali Ibrahim Khan strove to achieve justice not by referring to absolute 
religious and legal differences, but to the importance of locality.  Here, reading Ali 
Ibrahim Khan’s historical writing together with his legal commentary allows 
Chatterjee to uncover the principles which for him defined the legal implications of 
location; these turn out to be royal prerogative as well as shared social practice or 
custom.  
 
Placed slightly later in time,  Lakshmi Subramanian’s essay on piracy in the 
northeastern Indian Ocean littoral, “Piracy and Legality in the Northward: Colonial 
articulations of law, custom and policy in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-
century Bombay Presidency” reconstructs the highly commercialized economy of 
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violence which the East Indian Company both participated in, and attempted to 
conquer.  Through a close reading of archival records, she deconstructs the East India 
Company’s legal discourse, which condemned myriad small coastal principalities and 
communities as “piratical,” suppressing the material and political conditions that 
made maritime raiding the only viable lifestyle for many thus condemned.  While not 
entirely convinced about the possibility of ethical sympathy under such conditions, 
she also recovers the more sensitive ethnography of certain officials of the East India 
Company and the Bombay Marine, and their recommendations for pragmatic 
compromise with such coastal actors.  Finally, the article turns towards the self-
understanding of such “pirates” themselves; and using testimony recorded during their 
trials, offers a view of resistant subalterns rather than adroit pirate-lawyers of the kind 
that Benton has written much about.  
 
Neilesh Bose’s “New Settler Colonial Histories at the Edges of Empire: 
‘Asiatics,’ Settlers, and law in colonial South Africa” is the second self-consciously 
trans-national essay in the collection, and one that studies the legal experiences 
Indian, Chinese and Malay migrant workers in South Africa in order to unsettle the 
often implicitly held notion of “settlers” as European.  Examining more than a century 
of discriminatory legislation, both in the colonies of South Africa and in India, the 
essay interrogates the legal category of “Asiatic,” and highlights how such a 
geographical referent was a specific method of denying cultural particularity and 
highlighting absolute racial differences.  The essay then proceeds to uncover the 
alternative categories of self-description used by such Indian, Chinese and Malay 
“settlers,” and points to several different approaches taken, including assertion of 
local residence and subjectivity derived therefrom, but also clearly racialised 
assertions of being imperial subjects, aimed at self-distinction from native Africans, or 
“Kafirs.”  In surveying alternative modes of self-description and self-assertion by 
these “other settlers,” Bose recommends returning to the admittedly discriminatory 
category of “Asiatic,” in order to recover the possibility of more inclusive histories, 
unrestricted by the national boundaries that continue to afflict studies of imperial law 
and resistance to it. 
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Rajarshi Ghose, in his  essay “Islamic Law and Imperial Space: British India 
as ‘domain of Islam,’ circa 1803-1870,” points, like Chatterjee, to Islam as a source of 
alternative spatial and legal imagination, while engaging with a different period of 
time and a different set of protagonists in colonial northern India and Bengal.  Rather 
than Shi‘a administrators, we now have eminent Sunni religious scholars whose 
arguments about Islamic law and its political implications are articulated not in the 
specific-resolution-seeking context of legal trials but the expansive ethical-political 
space opened up by print (especially the Urdu press), associations and public debates.  
Tracing how across three spiritual/intellectual generations, Hanafi juriconsults, 
deploying familiar principles and argumentative techniques came to argue  that the 
British empire in India was a domain of peace rather than war, Ghose reveals the 
powerful alternative claims of political legitimacy that arose from this apparently 
quiescent formulation.  
 
And finally, Stephanie Jones’ essay “Maritime Space as Law and Light: 
Retrieving William Clark Russell’s An Ocean Free-Lance (1882)” returns attention to 
those European pirates whose negotiation of empire and law played a central role in 
Lauren Benton’s explorations of legal pluralism.  This inter-disciplinary essay 
critically highlights the distinctively English intertwining of legal and literary 
aesthetics in the age of empires; and points to multiple values expressed through the 
character of the unruly ocean-goer, sometimes privateer, sometimes pirate.  Jones 
astutely points out that the continued romanticization of the pirate has long lent itself 
to implicit (and in some cases, explicit) valorisation of empire and justification of its 
violence.  But the essay also points to the implicit ethical criticism of empire 
expressed by such maritime novels, in which the pirate is not only a wily negotiator of 
imperial laws, but sometimes also a defiant opponent, and at others an anxious seeker 
of an ethical space beyond law and beyond racial and national hierarchies.  Returning 
attention to the question of sympathy and its possibility, Jones demonstrates that 
Clark Russell’s novels reveal awareness of a crowded ocean, peopled with many 
“salty subalterns,” whether or not he proves capable of imagining an adequate place 
of justice for all of them.  
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Together, these essays make a significant intervention in the existing 
historiography on law and space in the context of empire.  Without being overtly 
theoretical, they offer critical qualifications to the idea of an expansive European 
imperial sovereignty, and express constructive dissatisfaction with the notion of 
pragmatic negotiation of legal regimes by the marginal and the colonized.  Instead, 
together they propose a number of ways in which historical protagonists, European 
and well as non-European, imagined different coherent versions of empire and law, 
and reveal the multiple sources of sovereignty that such imaginations and 
enunciations rested upon.  Such a perspective enables us to treat the idea of legal 
posturing more critically, and suggest that there may be more to be learnt about the 
practices and understandings of entitlements, obligations, subjectivity and 
transgression in the age of empires.  We envisage further work on the legal spaces of 
empire, among other things through investigations into the visible coding of space, for 
instance through maps and other material artefacts of representation; examination of 
the physical structuration of the courtrooms and their performative aspects; and 
studies of documentary regimes, pertaining both to routine governance and 
adjudication, as well as liminal situations such as immigration checkpoints and battle-
zones.  In all this we hope to find area-specialists bringing their linguistic and archival 
skills to bear upon the broader questions of how empires shaped the world, to reveal 
what people other than European imperialists had to say about the process. 
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